Self-Defense: Preemptive, Immediate, and Retaliatory

by Russell Madden

When the American public was being massaged by the present administration to accept the soon-to-be-waged, undeclared war against Iraq, we were offered a variety of reasons why we had to invade Saddam Hussein's dominion and do so now:

He had weapons of mass destruction. He was going to give them to al-Qaeda or some other terrorist group. He had and was murdering his own people. He was a mad, undeterrable dictator. He would destroy his oil wells. He violated United Nations accords resulting from the last Gulf War. He was hiding his WMD's. He suppressed religious freedom. He denied his people self-determination. He lived in splendor while Iraqis lived in poverty. He cheated at solitaire.

(Sorry. Made that last one up...)

Somehow, in the strange and wonderful calculus of Cloud Cuckooland, a.k.a., Washington, D.C., these factors added up to what our prez said was a sufficient and necessary rationale for invading Iraq and deposing Saddam. In order to secure the safety of the United States; to free the Iraqi people; and for truth, justice, and the American Way, we, i.e., the politicians, er, I mean, our soldiers had to "shock and awe" their way to Baghdad in a "preemptive war."

Preemptive war.

Many citizens — well, a few of us, anyway — shuddered at this seeming reversal of a supposedly long-standing American policy never to initiate a war. The prez assured us, however, that this preemptive strike was different than what, say, Nazi Germany did when it invaded Poland. It was hokey-dokey today because we would be "safer" once we'd booted ol' S.H. in the bum. It was, he said, self-defense.

Of course, if this war actually represented an instance of legitimate self-defense, then no worries. But then, if the moon were made of cheese, we could eat it...

The prez proceeded merrily along on his plans for conquest on the unstated assumption that there is only one species of "preemption," i.e., that our invasion of Iraq would be/was de facto proper.

But a preemptive war — like individual self-defense — has more than one aspect to consider in judging its validity.

In terms of combat, what we are discussing here is the acquisition of the military initiative: We will invade or assault another country before its forces (can) attack us.

Is this a good idea? Depends.

First, let's consider the situation of what I call an individual's preemptive self-defense.

A preemptive attack — i.e., physically harming someone else before you yourself have suffered actual physical (or property) damage — would be justified for an individual if, in an emergency situation, he had a rational (reasonable) expectation that another person was about to assault him.

For example, if a stranger entered a person's home uninvited in the middle of the night and was carrying a drawn weapon, the home owner could logically infer that the intruder was up to no good and might well intend harm to the occupant. Given the immediate, emergent nature of the situation and the overall context, the home owner could not reasonably be expected to engage in calm inquiry as to the invader's intent in visiting and in holding a (presumably) loaded weapon. If the home owner attempted such a dispassionate conversation, he would — in all probability — discover the truth soon enough...but too late to do anything about it to save himself.

(I will assume the morality of self-defense. Those who disagree with this fact have problems way beyond the scope of this writing...)

Since the home owner must, of necessity, take action — now! — without the luxury of gathering all relevant and possible evidence before making a judgment, he would be warranted in implementing any number of actions: hiding in a closet; calling 9-11 (ha-ha!); striking the intruder with a fist or traditional blunt object; or shooting the SOB. No warning would be required before the homeowner struck. Indeed, a shouted warning might preclude him from stopping the invader and increase the risk to his own safety.

He could ethically do any of these things even though the intruder had not yet actually physically harmed the home owner.

(In a broad but accurate sense, this could also be thought of as a kind of "retaliation," i.e., for the break-in. But if, for example, some drunk wandered in thinking he was home but did nothing else other than stumble about, there would be little justification in striking or shooting the slob, though he could still face criminal charges for his inappropriate [and stupid] behavior.)

If the home owner were wrong in his judgment as to the nature or level of danger and acted violently upon what later proved to be unconvincing evidence or unrealistic expectations of harm, he could legally be liable for "jumping the gun." (Of course, a person could ultimately be wrong in his judgment about the danger and still be legally free of punishment if a jury [or whoever] judged that the criteria he used and the actions he took were, given the uncertain circumstances, believable and rational, even if in error.)

The second situation — which I label immediate self-defense — can be thought of as responding instantly to physical harm or attack begun by another person (presuming the defender had done nothing to precipitate the assault at an earlier time). If another person hits a peaceful you with a bat or fist or shoots you — or even if none of those actually connect with your body — any proportionate response on your part to stop the other person would be proper. The attacker need not even actively be continuing his assault at the moment for you to be justified in attacking him. Simply because he dropped the bat, paused to catch his breath, or stopped to clear a jam in his gun, you would not have to wait for him to recommence his attack before responding. (Again, the aggrieved party's attack can be thought of as [immediate] retaliation, but for the purposes of this discussion, I reserve that latter term for the last kind of self-defense.)

(If any law enforcement personnel were present in the vicinity, they, too, could [and, in order to fulfill their duty, would have to] intervene to stop the violence immediately. Sorting out who was aggressor and who victim would have to come later after an investigation of the facts of the case.)

The third situation — which I call retaliatory self-defense — is applicable when an attack has been perpetrated against an individual but the criminal party is no longer present. (To be technical, in the context of this discussion, using both "retaliation" and "self-defense" in response to an initiation of force is redundant, akin to saying "individual rights," but necessary given the deliberate obfuscation used by our leaders to obscure reality.)

Since vigilantism is rarely a good response (though there are exceptions), retaliatory self-defense occurs when the matter is dealt with after-the-fact in accordance with objective laws and within the scope of proper legal procedures. Law enforcement personnel apprehend the alleged criminal; evidence is presented and proof of guilt offered in a court of law; the suspect is convicted or set free; and, if convicted, restitution and/or punishment are established. The criminal is placed in a jail (or executed) so he can harm no one else.

Now we move on to how this applies to what is proper for a government to do in the international arena.

Many supporters of the Iraqi war implicitly or explicitly rely on the (false) principle that "if an individual can do X, then the State can do X." In making such an argument, war advocates blur the very real differences between what actions are proper to a person and which are proper to a government. As libertarian writer George H. Smith has written, an individual has the option of acting to defend, say, a third party who is being attacked by someone who is not threatening that bystander. The State, however, does not properly possess the option among its delegated powers of going to the aid of a country (such as Kuwait) that is being invaded by another country (such as Iraq) that poses no real and immediate threat to its own citizens (such as Americans).

(Indeed, an individual has the option of whether or not to defend himself. He might decide that the risks or results of striking back would lead to even more dire consequences or harm to him or others. Nevertheless, the principle of self-defense — the right to defend oneself — is absolute within the context of initiated coercion, regardless of whether or not one decides to act upon that right. A proper government, however, has no such leeway. It must respond [within its territorial jurisdiction and to the extent that it can] to initiations of coercion by individuals against [and only against] its own citizens.)

These limits on what the State may or may not do flow from the proper nature of government. A State's sole, valid goal is the protection of the rights — the lives and property — of its own citizens from violations by aggressors. Any person or group that initiates violence/coercion against peaceful citizens is subject to apprehension and prosecution by the State. The citizens of a nation delegate (but do not surrender) their right to self-defense to the State. They engage or employ the State to act on their behalf in meting out retaliatory self-defense against criminals who violate their rights.

Given these constraints, the range of legitimate actions and options available and proper to an individual is far wider than it is for the State. The former may do anything that is peaceful. The latter may (and must) do only that which is designed to protect the rights of its employers, i.e., the State has only enumerated and delegated powers and is not permitted to do anything — no matter how nice or good or wonderful — that is not involved in the performance of those severely delimited duties.

In other words, the only actions proper for the State are those involving the (self-)defense of its citizens (which actions, in turn, derive solely from the right of those individuals to defend themselves).

In the context of individual criminals, the State may retaliate against anyone who has committed a coercive act (e.g., a murderer) even if that individual is, at the time of apprehension, behaving peaceably.

In the context of other nations or foreign enemies, the State must retaliate against any country or enemy that has actually attacked or invaded its citizens within its jurisdiction (with the goal of restoring the status ante of its citizens' abilities to exercise their rights). (Cf Japanese at Pearl Harbor or al-Qaeda in New York City.) To fail to do so when such a course of action is possible is for the State to abrogate its duties and responsibilities, i.e., to betray its sole purpose for existing.

I hope no one is maintaining that the Iraqis ever invaded the U.S. If they had, we would have the right to attack them. But they did not. So this eliminates "retaliatory self-defense" as a justification for our invasion of Iraq.

When we invaded Iraq, the Iraqi army was not in the midst of attacking us, so that rules out "immediate self-defense" as a justification for our invasion of Iraq.

The only straw of hope left for pro-war advocates, then, is "preemptive self-defense."

A preemptive military invasion/attack against another country would be legitimate if, for example, the enemy army was massed upon one's borders with convincing evidence present — based on similar situations in the past, on what the enemy leaders were saying, troop movements, etc. — that they would soon be crossing the border. A nation does not have to "directly attack" us in order for us properly to stop them.

But just as extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence, so, too, does an event as serious as a war require more than casual or vague evidence to justify a preemptive action.

In other words, the burden of proof — or at a minimum, a preponderance of the evidence — is on those supporting the war. It is incumbent upon them to demonstrate in a convincing manner that Iraq represented an immediate, clear-and-present threat — an imminent danger — to the lives and property of Americans in the United States.

But nearly all the reasons offered by pro-war advocates were behaviors that had been going on for years in Iraq or that did not represent a real and immediate threat to us. (Danger to other nations does not count in this equation.) Vague, ill-defined, and unestablished "potential" threats (as defined solely by the attacker) that reek of "prior restraint" and can be applied virtually to anyone are impermissible as reasons for striking first against either individuals or other nations.

There are/have been any number of nations with WMD's, mass murderers for leaders, and that supported terrorists. Are we to invade them all? Plus, none of this is a direct or imminent threat to the U.S. Or are threats against Israel now to be equated with threats to the U.S.? None of these side issues establish the fact that Iraq was an imminent or direct threat that substantively distinguished it from any other tyranny in the world. Nothing was or has been presented that proves that these ongoing issues should have been elevated to "imminent" status.

Somehow, though, to the pro-war crowd, Iraq is sui generis. Somehow, it deserved to be invaded while similar dictatorships do not "need" to be invaded. (At least those calling for us to "liberate" Syria, Iran, N. Korea etc. etc. are consistent in their empire-building impulses.)

So, again, to focus this discussion on actions legitimate for a government:

Invasion/war is proper and required if another nation or foreign enemy is or has attacked or invaded the USA. (An actual coercive action was committed or is being committed.)

Invasion/war is proper and required if another nation or foreign enemy is imminently going to attack or invade the USA. (The other nation/enemy is in the process of or about to initiate a coercive action in the immediate future [not years down the line].)

Prove either of those conditions were met in our war against Iraq, and I will join the pro-war side.

But, of course, the administration and its supporters are not even attempting to fulfill this requirement.

Retaliation and defensive preemption — whether against an actual attack or an imminent one — is proper for individuals or a government. Aggression — that is, initiating coercion (for any reason) — is not.

Aggressive preemption, then, occurs when a nation that does not represent an actual or imminent, clear-and-present danger is invaded by another country for reasons other than past or imminent rights violations against the invader's citizens. What people — or a nation — "might" do is no valid basis for preemptively attacking either one.

Or are we to accept the desirability of the world portrayed in Philip K. Dick's Minority Report?

The war against Iraq was an unconstitutional invasion that violated the proper role of any valid government: protection of its own citizens' rights. We have enough "monsters" to destroy here at home without seeking them abroad.

Until offered credible proof to the contrary, I will continue to judge the invasion of Iraq as an example of preemptive aggression, not preemptive self-defense.

The fact that this reality has been widely ignored explains much about both the popularity of this illegitimate war and the sucking quagmire that this society is fast becoming.

As Thomas Jefferson said:

"What more is necessary to make us a happy and a prosperous people? ...a wise and frugal Government, which shall restrain men from injuring one another, shall leave them otherwise free to regulate their own pursuits of industry and improvement, and shall not take from the mouth of labor the bread it has earned. This is the sum of good government."

That would be plenty.


Postscript

While it is true, as Rand said, that tyrant states forfeit moral legitimacy, and another free state has the "right" to invade, the number of actual instances in which this would be a good idea or a proper use of American lives and resources is miniscule. (Remember, just because someone has the right to do X, it does not automatically follow that X is the right thing to do.) Indeed, I don't recall Rand actually advocating we invade any specific nation to "set the people free." Beyond this is the sad fact that we do not even have a free country here; there is zero probability that a truly free society will be established in Iraq or any other nation we happen to invade.


See Russ Madden's articles, short stories, novel excerpts, and items of interest to Objectivists, libertarians, and sci-fi fans at http://home.earthlink.net/~rdmadden/webdocs/.


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from The Laissez Faire Electronic Times, Vol 2, No 18, May 5, 2003
Editor: Emile Zola     Publisher: Digital Monetary Trust